Shall There Be a Convention to Revise the Constitution and Amend the Same? by McNally, James B. M.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 31 
Number 2 Volume 31, May 1957, Number 2 Article 2 
May 2013 
Shall There Be a Convention to Revise the Constitution and 
Amend the Same? 
James B. M. McNally 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
McNally, James B. M. (1957) "Shall There Be a Convention to Revise the Constitution and Amend the 
Same?," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 31 : No. 2 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss2/2 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
SHALL THERE BE A CONVENTION TO REVISE
THE CONSTITUTION AND 'AMEND THE SAME?
JAMES B. XW. McNALLYf
A RICLE XIX, Section 2, of the New York State Constitu-
tion, requires the submission at the general election to be
held in 1957 of the question "'Shall there be a convention to
revise the constitution and amend the same?' ". The Constitu-
tion also provides for a method of amendment at the instance
of the Legislature. Ours is a constitutional form of govern-
ment. Its successful operation depends on the balance of the
three departments of government: legislative, judicial and
executive; each autonomous, operating on the same plane,
with a minimum of friction and conflict, no one overpowering
the others. -History has shown that the people cease to be
the source of powet when one governing branch gains marked
ascendancy.
It is inevitable, indeed it is inherent, in the form of con-
stitutional government we enjoy, that there be competition
for the approbation of the governed; with approbation the
tendency is to influence and submerge the other branches of
government. When imbalance develops, curbing of the
ascending branch or stimulation of the other branches is
indicated. In all events balance of the three co-ordinate
branches must be achieved. That is not to say, however, that
the conditions of government are to be frozen. They should
be fluid and flexible, able to cope with ever changing times
and conditions. The analogy between our constitutional form
of government and the human organism is complete when it
appears that each contains the seeds of destruction as well
as the seeds of progress and fulfilhnent, and that in the
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human organism the brain serves to balance the inner drives
and in our constitutional government it is the people or, if
you will, the collective brain power of the governed which
exerts the balancing effort if the government is to operate at
optimum.
The constant and unremitting effort of each department
of government to gain influence carries with it beneficial as
well as disadvantageous effects. That part of the effort which
redounds to the public good is, of course, the end result to
be sought, encouraged and stimulated; that which tends to
submerge, inhibit and overpower co-ordinate units is charged
with the poison which undermines free government. Eternal
watchfulness alone can prevent disintegration of free'govern-
ment. The time to act is when the evidence tends to support
suspicion; to await the active stage of the poisoning process
is to invite disaster.
The amending process of the Constitution, which may
originate in the Legislature, does not permit full, objective
and integrated changes.- The Legislature might be inclined
toward curtailing and inhibiting the judicial and executive
branches of government. It is possible that it would not be
equally zealous in respect of measures which tend to limit its
own activities. Hence the constitutional measures emanating
from the Legislature alone might tend toward imbalance of
the units of government. The only other source of constitu-
tional amendment, and, the one least likely to create a dis-
torted result, is the constitutional convention. Then and
then only is constitutional government, in its entirety, ex-
posed to the critical eye of a group representative of the
governed and the government.
The necessity for constitutional change is vouchsafed by
the submission of the many constitutional questions at each
general election since 1938, in which year the last Constitu-
tional Convention was held. The constitutional questions
submitted since 1938 to the electorate pertained to many sub-
jects of public interest, such as the judiciary, railroad grade
crossings, term and compensation of legislators, conservation,
fiscal policies, voting requirements, reapportionment, succes-
sion to offices, veterans, civil service, public officers, housing,
hospitals, welfare, real estate taxes and pensions.
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At the forefront today is the drive for overhauling the
judicial structure. Whether the suggested plan will meet the
critical problem of congestion in the courts is extremely
doubtful. Informed proponents of the plan do not advance
it as a cure for congestion. Unfortunately the lay public is
inclined to believe that the proposed plan is a panacea.
Change may be indicated. However, the nature and extent
thereof may be best derived from the objective, careful, expert
and multilateral consideration possible only at a Constitu-
tional Convention. Furthermore, any amendments proposed
by a Constitutional Convention will be submitted for final
action with as much dispatch as amendments proposed by
the Legislatures of 1957 and 1959.
If none of the problems with which we are confronted
was present, it would be sufficient justification for a Consti-
tutional Convention if its sole purpose was to appraise the
operations of government and ascertain whether there are
present forces which tend toward imbalance, and if they are
present, to recommend corrective measures.
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